If you are even an amateur fan of game theory, you must have come across the term “MAD”:

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender (see pre-emptive nuclear strike and second strike). It is based on the theory of deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy’s use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.
The term “mutual assured destruction”, commonly abbreviated “MAD”, was coined by Donald Brennan, a strategist working in Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute in 1962. However, Brennan came up with this acronym ironically, to argue that holding weapons capable of destroying society was irrational.

As with most theoretical concepts, it has its fair share of exceptions and limitations. Reading the Criticism section of the Wikipedia article is a great way to depress yourself, for example. But today, we depress ourselves a little bit more, by thinking about an article whose cheerful title is “The Math is Bad for MAD“:

Alarmingly, the current modernization of nuclear-missile arsenals by both Russia and China exposes a simple mathematical flaw in the assumptions underlying continued reliance on MAD. Despite our having ~1,400 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, they are postured such that a surprise attack by approximately 70 – 100 Russian or Chinese missiles—a fraction of their total nuclear forces—could soon undermine our “assured” retaliatory capability.

The rest of the article explains how China and Russia could, quite conceivably, undermine the US’ “assured” retaliatory capability. And when I say “quite conceivably”, I am not exaggerating. The authors, Norman Haller and Peter Pry lay out with implacable logic how China and Russia might think through all of the moves in this most dangerous of games, and reach the conclusion that America’s ability to “assure” retaliatory capability is not, in fact, assured. I will not excerpt anything to defend my argument, please read the entire article.

So what, one might ask, is to be done? The authors lay out seven things that America could conceivably do, and evaluate each of them in turn. Again, read the whole thing, it is in your interest to do so. I will, however, excerpt their concluding paragraph:

Finally, U.S. decision-makers should tune out minimalists who ignore the math and advocate replacing the Triad with either a Diad (bombers and submarines only) or, even worse, a Monad (submarines only). Tuned out as well should be MAD proponents who are inattentive to the math and insist that an undefended America is a positive asset.

You may agree with that paragraph, you may not. But you should, as a student of game theory, ask yourself if you can frame your agreement (or otherwise) in game theoretic terms. It is a useful (albeit depressing) exercise in your journey as a student of game theory.

And finally, for your reading pleasure, a further selection of cheer inducing books by one of the authors.

As my favorite bloggers like to say at the end of posts that are as optimistic as this one, have a nice day.

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