Where Next For the NITI Aayog?

The NITI Aayog must be converted from a Department of Development Implementation to a High Command of Development Strategy.

https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/reforming-the-niti-aayog-122051601487_1.html

That’s the very last sentence of a thought-provoking column by Nitin Desai. The column is about why the NITI Aayog (in Nitin Desai’s opinion) hasn’t done all of what was hoped of it, and what needs to change for some of these hopes to be realized.

But for us to reach the end of this column, we need to start somewhere, and we’ll start with the setting up of the Planning Commission.


The Indian planning project was one of the postcolonial world’s most ambitious experiments. It was an arranged marriage between Soviet-inspired economic planning and Western-style liberal democracy, at a time when the Cold War portrayed them as ideologically contradictory and institutionally incompatible. With each Five-Year Plan, the Planning Commission set the course for the nation’s economy. The ambit ranged from matters broad (free trade or protectionism?) to narrow (how much fish should fisheries produce to ensure protein in the national diet?). The Commission’s pronouncements set the gears of government in motion. Shaping entire sectors of the economy through incentives, disincentives and decree, the Planning Commission’s views rippled across the land to every farm and factory. Despite this awesome power, economic planning in India was considerably different from the kind practised in communist regimes. The Planning Commission was reined in by democratic procedure that required consultation with ministries in an elected government, with people’s representatives in Parliament—and ultimately with the popular will—through citizens voting every five years.

Menon, Nikhil. Planning Democracy (p. 9). Penguin Random House India Private Limited. Kindle Edition.

That’s from a book I’m currently reading (and thoroughly enjoying), Planning Democracy. There’s a lot to like about the book, and I hope to write a full review once I’m done, but for the moment, think about just the title. There’s a (hopefully healthy) tension implicit in it, because as the excerpt above puts it, the Planning Commission was to be reined in by democratic procedure.

What was it supposed to do? Further on in the same chapter from the book I have just quoted is a nice compact description of what was supposed to have happened:

Its potency stemmed from its authority to draw up an economic roadmap for the country and back it with all the resources and policy instruments available to the Government of India.

Menon, Nikhil. Planning Democracy (p. 21). Penguin Random House India Private Limited. Kindle Edition.

That is, there are two separate but interlinked things worth noting: it had to develop an plan of economic development for a newly independent India, and in order to do so, it had the backing in terms of resources and policy instruments. By the way, there is a reason the word “resources” has not been qualified with a word like financial – the back was not just financial, but also political, given the presence of the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers as members.

The story of how the Planning Commission evolved, struggled, and refined itself over time (not always successfully, it should be mentioned) is a fascinating one, but not one that we can cover in a single blog post, alas. But long story (very) short, the Planning Commission came to an end in 2015:

Born the same year, Modi and the Planning Commission shared another milestone together. In his first Independence Day address as India’s leader, Modi declared that the Planning Commission had once merited its place and made significant contributions. Now, however, he believed it had decayed beyond repair. ‘Sometimes it costs a lot to repair an old house,’ he said, ‘but it gives us no satisfaction.’ Afterwards we realize ‘that we might as well build a new house’, Modi explained with a smile. He would build it by bulldozing a decrepit structure and raising a shiny new one, the NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India).

Menon, Nikhil. Planning Democracy (p. 8). Penguin Random House India Private Limited. Kindle Edition.

And how has the NITI Aayog done?

But despite progress in these areas, some 7 years since the establishment of NITI Aayog, questions are being raised as to whether India can continue to function without medium-term planning. Annual budget allocations are made by the Finance Ministry to meet various investment goals and objectives but without a well-defined plan. NITI Aayog’s advice is also not taken seriously by state governments as it comes without resources. Some feel that NITI Aayog should have resources it allocates to address development imbalances and that the Ministry of Finance is naturally focused on budgetary management rather than development outcomes.6While no one wants a return to the old Planning Commission, a more involved and competent NITI Aayog, with a stronger voice is clearly needed.

Ajay Chhibber, 2022. “Economic Planning in India: Did We Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater?,” Working Papers 2022-03, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.

The idea itself isn’t all that new. Back in 2019, Vijay Kelkar had given a speech in which he proposed “NITI Aayog 2.0”:

It should rather strive to be a think tank with “praxis” possessing considerable financial muscle and devote its energies to outline coherent medium and long term strategy and corresponding investment resources for transforming India. Towards this, my preliminary study suggests that the NITI Aayog 2.0 will annually need the resources of around 1.5% to 2% of the GDP to provide suitable grants to the States for mitigating the development imbalance. These formulaic annual grants, whether capital grants or revenue grants for the relevant CSS will need to be conditional to ensure that (1) outcomes are commensurate and (2) it discourages an individual State to adopt policies that have negative policy externalities, e.g., creation of populist subsidies and thus avoid race to the bottom. Such presence of “negative policy externalities” we notice often, e.g., the provision of free “electricity,” irrigation water subsidies, etc. “Gresham’s Law” seems to be relevant not only for the currency markets alone!

Towards India’s New Fiscal Federalism, No. 252, NIPFP Working Paper Series, Vijay Kelkar (https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/01/WP_252_2019.pdf)

If you don’t know what Gresham’s Law is, take a look here.


All of which eventually gets us back to the column that we started with, by Nitin Desai:

The real problem of strategy formation for development is that it is not being done. The NITI Aayog has produced some vision documents; but they are not agreed strategies formulated after widespread consultations with experts and discussion with the states. The word “niti” in the name of this organisation is an abbreviation for National Institution for Transforming India. This task requires looking a level above the designing of programmes to a strategy from which programmes must be derived.
A grand strategy for development must spell out the opportunities and threats faced by the key objectives of development which are growth, equity and sustainability. It must then identify the changes in the role of the public and private sector, shifts in global economic alliances and policy shifts that are required to maximise benefits from opportunities and manage risks from threats. The time frame for a grand strategy has to be long-term but the more specific strategies derived from it must take into account short- and medium-term challenges that the country faces.

https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/reforming-the-niti-aayog-122051601487_1.html

We need, that is to say, a NITI Aayog that focuses on not just reporting what has been (or is being) done, but also on explaining what needs to be done, over what time period, and why, along with some pointers towards what risks we might encounter. Or as Nitin Desai puts it, “The new Vice-Chairman, Suman Bery, must bring in the talent required and launch a process of broad-based consultation, particularly with the states, to secure a broad national consensus on a long-term growth strategy. Specific programmes must be based on the implementation of this strategy.”

Easier said than done, of course, but this is where NITI Aayog needs to go next.

Imports, Exports and GDP

“The key is to understand that imports are also included in consumption, investment, and government spending. The real GDP breakdown looks like this:

  • GDP = Domestically produced consumption + Imported consumption + Domestically produced investment + Imported investment + Government spending on domestically produced stuff + Government spending on imported stuff + Exports – Imports

So you can see that while imports are subtracted from GDP at the end of this equation, they’re also added to the earlier parts of the equation. In other words, imports are first added to GDP and then subtracted out again. So the total contribution of imports on GDP is zero.”

That is an excerpt from a lovely little write-up by Noah Smith on his Substack, and one that I’ll be using whenever I teach macro. It’s lovely for many reasons, but most of all for the reason that the bullet point goes a very long way towards making the point that a lot of folks miss: you don’t get rich by importing less.

When I say “you”, I mean the country in question – and this equation, written out this way, helps us understand why. If you’re a student of macro, and are under the impression that India will get richer if only we imported lesser, think about the definition of GDP:

Gross domestic product (GDP) is the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country’s borders in a specific time period.

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp

If you think about it, how can imports possibly qualify as being produced within a country’s borders? As Noah says, the equation can also be written like this:

GDP = Domestically produced consumption + Domestically produced investment + Government spending on domestically produced stuff + Exports

https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/imports-do-not-subtract-from-gdp?s=r

Read the rest of Noah’s post, especially if you are a student of macroeconomics. It should help clear up a lot of basic, but important and often misunderstood ideas about GDP calculations.


https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/05/13/russia-is-on-track-for-a-record-trade-surplus

Russia has stopped publishing detailed monthly trade statistics. But figures from its trading partners can be used to work out what is going on. They suggest that, as imports slide and exports hold up, Russia is running a record trade surplus.
On May 9th China reported that its goods exports to Russia fell by over a quarter in April, compared with a year earlier, while its imports from Russia rose by more than 56%. Germany reported a 62% monthly drop in exports to Russia in March, and its imports fell by 3%. Adding up such flows across eight of Russia’s biggest trading partners, we estimate that Russian imports have fallen by about 44% since the invasion of Ukraine, while its exports have risen by roughly 8%.

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/05/13/russia-is-on-track-for-a-record-trade-surplus

Think about the previous section, and try and answer this question: is Russia poorer or richer or unchanged because Russia isn’t importing as much, as measured by GDP and changes in GDP?

Well, Russia may be worse off, and Russians may be worse off. It’s leader?

As a result, analysts expect Russia’s trade surplus to hit record highs in the coming months. The iif reckons that in 2022 the current-account surplus, which includes trade and some financial flows, could come in at $250bn (15% of last year’s gdp), more than double the $120bn recorded in 2021. That sanctions have boosted Russia’s trade surplus, and thus helped finance the war, is disappointing, says Mr Vistesen. Ms Ribakova reckons that the efficacy of financial sanctions may have reached its limits. A decision to tighten trade sanctions must come next.
But such measures could take time to take effect. Even if the eu enacts its proposal to ban Russian oil, the embargo would be phased in so slowly that the bloc’s oil imports from Russia would fall by just 19% this year, says Liam Peach of Capital Economics, a consultancy. The full impact of these sanctions would be felt only at the start of 2023—by which point Mr Putin will have amassed billions to fund his war.

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/05/13/russia-is-on-track-for-a-record-trade-surplus (Emphasis added)

Macro is hard! But it also matters, especially at times such as these.

Critical Issues Confronting China Featuring Bert Hoffman

Via Noah Smith’s post on China’s growth prospects, which we covered this past Tuesday:

On the “Natural” rate of unemployment

Lovely Twitter handle, I must say, and if you don’t already, please do follow him on Twitter.

The Solow Model and China

If you don’t know what the Solow model is, here is a great place to get started:

There are 11 videos in that series, and if you can spare the time, please watch all of them. Just two a day (they’re not more than 5 minutes each), and you’ll be done come the weekend.

But in effect, here is what the Solow model says:

  1. Output for a nation is a function of three (actually four) things:
    1. Capital (K): Buidings, ports, dams… infrastructure, basically.
    2. Education Augmented Labor (eL): The amount of hours that a person is able to put in to their work, but with the built in assumption that an educated person is likely to be more productive than a person without education.
    3. Ideas: Read the paragraph below to get a sense of what this means in practice.

Think about this blogpost that you are reading. I wrote it using my laptop, which is my capital. I will spend about an hour (that’s my plan, I’ll update you towards the end of this post about how well it worked out) writing it, and that’s the labor that I’ll be putting into this post. The fact that I have been “educated” in economics should mean that this post will be easier to write for me than, say, a gardener. The gardener could have written this post as well, of course, but it’s safe to assume that she would first have had to learn about the Solow model, and that, presumably, would have taken longer.

So that’s K and eL where the output (this blogpost) is concerned. But now think about it this way: what if another person, with a similar level of economics education as mine were to write this blogpost instead of me? Would that person have chosen this video, and these paragraphs to explain the Solow model? Maybe they would have recommended some other video, or some other podcast, or chosen to share details of an online textbook in which the Solow model is explained. That’s one way to think about ideas.

And so when you combine the capital (the laptop), the labor (the time I spend on this blogpost, given my education levels) and the ideas (what I choose to put into this blog post, and how), you get the output you’re reading right now.

What if I double the capital? Will the blogpost be done in half the time? Say I have an external monitor attached to my laptop – will two screens mean finishing the blogpost in half the time? It will save some time, but not by a factor of two, surely. Trust me, I have tried.

What if I double the labor? Hire an assistant to write this blogpost with me? The way I work, trust me, it will probably take longer! What if I go get a post-doc, to augment my education? Will that save me time? The hysterical laughter you hear in the background is the response of any PhD/post-doc student anywhere in the world, and that sound means a loud and resounding no.

In a sense, the Solow model asks these and related questions, and answers them using some graphs and equations. Except, of course, the Solow model does it for not one guy writing one blog, but for an entire nation at a time. There is no sense in me explaining the whole model over here, for it would be a case of me reinventing what is already a very good wheel. Please watch the videos.


But the Solow model is a remarkably useful way to get a handle on the long run growth prospects of a country. Is India likely to grow in the future? Well, is it going to add to its capital stock? Yes. Is it going to augment it’s stock of education augmented labor? Yes. Is it likely to produce more ideas than it is right now? Yes. And so the growth prospects for India look reasonably good.

Of course, there is more to the Solow model. All of this holds true given a strong and stable political system, well established rules of law, and strong and capable institutions. But so long as you believe that these are likely to continue to be so in the Indian case, you should be bullish on India.

What about, say, Japan? It has a capital stock that is more in need of replacement than new construction ( a feature of the Solow model that we have not discussed here, called depreciation), so it is unlikely that it will grow its capital stock too much. Here’s an example of what I mean. What about it’s stock of education augmented labor? Well, the news ain’t very good. Ideas? Trending upwards, but not by much. So if I had to bet on which country would grow more over the next twenty years, I would bet on India, not Japan.

Bear in mind that this is a model, and like all models, it is an imprecise abstraction of reality. So it is possible that at the end of the twenty year period, we find out that I am completely wrong. But if you think the Solow Model is a reasonably good model, you ought to bet the way I did.


So what about China?

Well, now, that’s a whole different story, and one that Noah Smith talks about in a recent blog post. Long story short, he doesn’t think China’s growth prospects are that great.

But the story is a little more complicated than that. The Solow model is a good model, sure, but it’s not as if the Chinese authorities/experts aren’t aware of the problem. And in his blog post, Noah looks at arguments put forth by two people who know a thing or two about China, and analyzes them critically.

The first argument is that sure, China’s demographics are on a downward trend, but what if we raised the retirement age for Chinese workers? Would that not solve the problem? Noah says no, probably not, because firms made of exclusively old folks isn’t necessarily a good idea. I wholeheartedly agree.

What about adding to China’s urbanization, and therefore its infrastructure? After all, China’s urbanization rate is “only” 64%. The inverted quotes around only in the previous sentence is because we, in India, are officially at 31%, but as in the case of China, it very much is a function of how you define urbanization. But similarly, in China, the urbanization rate is actually way more than 64%, and the Lewis turning point has already taken place in China, or will do so any moment.

And about ideas, well, China is an even more complicated story. Noah makes the point that China’s industrial policy is essentially a one-man army that is trying something that has never been tried before, and Noah is betting on it not quite working out. And given the events of the last year and a half or so, it is hard to disagree.

And so the Solow Model would probably tell you that China is unlikely to grow as fast in the near future as it did in the recent past, and even if you take into account potential adjustments, it likely will still be the case that China’s growth rate will start to plateau.


Please, read the entire post by Noah. But if you are a student of economics who has not yet met the Solow Model, begin there, and then get on to Noah’s post – your mileage will increase considerably.

The meta-epistemology of the rate hike

Soon after I started blogging, Tyler Cowen joked, “You’re not really a blogger.” His point: Unlike most of the competition, I wasn’t reacting to the latest news or whatever’s hot. My goal as a blogger has always been to write think-pieces that stand the test of time.

https://www.econlib.org/a-fond-farewell-to-econlog/

I don’t know about standing the test of time where posts on EFE are concerned, but my approach to blogging is very similar: I prefer to not write about events immediately after they’ve occurred. This for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the fact that I’m lazy, and reading a lot of stuff at very short notice is something I would rather not do.

Another reason is that the very best pieces on any event usually take time to bubble up in my feed, and waiting therefore makes sense.

By the way, if you aren’t yet subscribed to Bryan Caplan’s new blog, please do!


But that being said, let’s talk about yesterday’s rate hike.

One of the pieces that I enjoyed writing last year was on the concept of meta-epistemology, after reading a post about it by Zeynep Tufekci.

I’m going to post a screenshot rather than an extract, because the formatting of the post helps:

https://econforeverybody.com/2021/02/05/zeynep-tufekci-on-metaepistomology/

Honest question: does this apply to the Reserve Bank of India as well?

Is it the case that the cost of downplaying inflation as a major problem now exceed the benefits of doing so? Have the incentives flipped for the RBI? If so, on what basis? Is there a sense, based on preliminary data, that inflation is a problem that can no longer be ignored?

And if so, how should we be interpreting not just the fact that rates have been raised, but the manner and the timing of the raise? In other words, are there two messages being sent out by the RBI: the message itself, and the implicit message encoded in the timing of the message?

And have (or will) the markets internalize this message, and if yes, what is to follow?


Learning about inflation, monetary policy, and the efficient market hypothesis via textbooks is less than half of the story. Take your view/model of how the world works to the world itself, and update your model as the years roll by.

Fun, exhilarating and occasionally nerve-wracking.

But it is the best way to learn.

David Warsh’s Take on Inflation

One of the sentences I have most enjoyed reading and internalizing is this one, by Scott Sumner: Never Reason From A Price Change.

I’ve capitalized each word in that sentence because it really is a sentence that makes you think until your head hurts. Here’s an early (perhaps the first) blog post from Scott in which he explains what he’s getting at:

My suggestion is that people should never reason from a price change, but always start one step earlier—what caused the price to change. If oil prices fall because Saudi Arabia increases production, then that is bullish news. If oil prices fall because of falling AD in Europe, that might be expansionary for the US. But if oil prices are falling because the euro crisis is increasing the demand for dollars and lowering AD worldwide; confirmed by falls in commodity prices, US equity prices, and TIPS spreads, then that is bearish news.

https://www.themoneyillusion.com/never-reason-from-a-price-change/

At its simplest – although there is always more to it than that – never reason from a price change means that the price might have changed because of demand, or supply or both. The headaches begin when you try to think through which of these might be more dominant, and the headache acquires splitting migraine status when you realize that you need to also ask about what else might be at play.

If you are a student of macroeconomics, a useful way to spend a morning is by clicking through this set of links and reading other posts by Scott Sumner on this topic. Remember, as always, the point is not to necessarily agree with Scott, but to read and ask how and why he arrives at his conclusions, and if you disagree with him, why do you do so. Best way to learn, especially if you can find a friend nerdy enough to do the exercise with you.


Which is a nice way to segue into our topic du jour: inflation.

A candy bar that cost a nickel in 1950 today costs $1.25 or so, depending on where you buy it. That, in a paper wrapper, is the price revolution of the twentieth century. Why did it happen? The answer usually given is that the quantity of money increased – too much paper money chasing too few candy bars.
A more satisfying explanation, casual though it may be, is to recognize that the global economy has grown considerably more complex since 1950, and the system of money, banking, and credit more complex along with it. The price of the candy bar wasn’t going to return to its previous level, no matter what the Fed or the candy-manufacturers did.

http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2022.05.01/2521.html

So begins a lovely little ruminative essay by David Warsh on how to think about inflation. It is lovely, but the emphasis in the previous sentence should be on the word “little”. I wish it was ten times longer!

But students used to textbook definitions of inflation might have their curiosity piqued after reading the second paragraph from the extract: what might complexity have to do with inflation?

A somewhat cryptic answer is given in the very next line that follows the end of the extract, where David Warsh refers to a book he wrote in 1984, called The Idea of Economic Complexity. I haven’t read the book, but I remember being told about it – alas, I can no longer remember who recommended it to me! But the idea of the book, from what I can recollect of the discussion, is as follows:

If you were to manufacture a Nokia 3310 today, odds are that you would be able to manufacture it at a fraction of the price that it commanded when it was first launched. Duh, you might think: so far, so obvious. Warsh’s point in the book is that this doesn’t necessarily mean that phones have become cheaper. In fact, as we can all attest, they go up in terms of price every year. The exact same thing might become cheaper, sure, but we keep making stuff more complex as we go along, and it is this increasing complexity that adds to inflation.

Now, bear in mind that I am treading on extremely thin ice over here! I’m describing a book to you that I haven’t read (strike one), on the basis of a conversation about the book that took place many years ago (strike two), and I’m now about to speculate on what else might be at play where this idea is concerned (strike three!).

All those CYA disclaimers aside, I’d like to think that complexity need not be just about the product itself, but could also be about the way it is manufactured, where all it is manufactured, where it is assembled, and how it is sold. Not to mention how all of this is financed!

As I’ve said before on these pages, macro is hard!


In Economic Development and the Price Level, in 1962, Geoffrey Maynard argued the opposite: that money generally adjusts to trade, rather than trade to money. In very different formats, the argument continues today.
“Development” is a bland word with which to describe the difference between the world economy in the time of Columbus and the world today. Economic philosopher David Ellerman has suggested that diversity describes the key difference, grounding his description in information theory; I proposed complexity in that 1984 book. But what is it that has become more diverse or complex? Not until I read “Increasing Returns an Economic Progress” (1928), by Allyn Young, did it occur to me that the growing complexity I had been thinking about were increases, of one sort or another, in the division of labor.

http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2022.05.01/2521.html

What a lovely excerpt, no? So much to add to the “To Read” list, but also how wonderful to pause and ponder on what the link might be between a Smithian division of labor and inflation. I hope you pause and think about this, much as I did when I read Warsh’s post, and again while drafting this paragraph right now.

To be clear: you’d expect division of labor to make systems more efficient, and therefore things cheaper. But Warsh suggests that there might be a way to link division of labor to complexity, and complexity to inflation!

Warsh ends his post in enigmatic fashion:

Are you comfortable with the too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods story? Do you believe that the Fed could have prevented the rise in its price? And if wasn’t “inflation,” then what was it? The depreciation of money, relative to goods?
As with the sixteenth-century voyages of discovery, money follows development and development follows money. If you have only the quantity theory of money to rely on, you don’t know what is going on.

http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2022.05.01/2521.html

And that, I’d argue, is A Good Thing. A Good Thing because it allows us to prioritize reading The Idea of Economic Complexity, and allows to think about what David Warsh might be hinting at. An incentive (a carrot) to read the book, in other words, and one that I plan to use in the coming weeks.

More Than An Inconvenient Iota of Truth

Regular people everywhere are being deprived of purchasing power — and tricked by chauvinists and opportunists into believing that their interests are fundamentally at odds. A global conflict between economic classes within countries is being misinterpreted as a series of conflicts between countries with competing interests.

https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/book-review-trade-wars-are-class?s=r

An extract twice removed, as it were, for Noah Smith extracted this bit in his excellent review of a book called Trade Wars are Class Wars, by Michael Pettis and Matthew C. Klein. I have not read it yet, but it has shot to the top of my reading list.

Any student who has attended a class in which I have taught aspects of international trade will tell you that I bore them to death with one particular theme: that the textbook study of international trade doesn’t adequately cover (in my opinion) the study of inequality.

Now that might sound weird if you are a student new to the study of international trade. What on earth, you might think, does inequality have to do with international trade?

Well, here’s the thesis put forward in the book, via Noah:

Trade Wars are Class Wars offers a provocative thesis — that what looks like economic competition between nations is actually just a manifestation of economic competition between classes within those nations.

https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/book-review-trade-wars-are-class?s=r

Again, I haven’t read the book, but this is slightly confusing to me. I have always thought of the causality running the other way around: increased competition between nations has exacerbated economic competition (and therefore inequality) within nations. It would seem that the authors think of it differently. Excellent, more things to ponder upon!


Why do I think that international trade is one causal factor where inequality is concerned? Let’s begin with an excellent article published by The Economist a few years ago:

In rich countries, skilled workers are abundant by international standards and unskilled workers are scarce. As globalisation has advanced, college-educated workers have enjoyed faster wage gains than their less educated countrymen, many of whom have suffered stagnant real earnings. On the face of it, this wage pattern is consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Globalisation has hurt the scarce “factor” (unskilled labour) and helped the abundant one.

https://www.economist.com/schools-brief/2016/08/06/an-inconvenient-iota-of-truth

Please, pretty please with a cherry on top, read the whole thing, especially if you have studied the Stolper Samuelson theorem. This article remains the best explainer that I have come across.

But what is being said here should be at least somewhat surprising to a student just beginning to study international trade. Trade, it would seem, may well be welfare enhancing, but it does not affect everybody a) equally and b) not necessarily positively! But, you might think as an Indian student, this might imply that unskilled labor in India might benefit from international trade.

Remember, one thing a good student of economics always bears in mind is a specific question: relative to what? That is, unskilled labor in India might well benefit from international trade, but relative to what? And the answer turns out to be, well, an unexpected one:

But look closer and puzzles remain. The theorem is unable to explain why skilled workers have prospered even in developing countries, where they are not abundant.

https://www.economist.com/schools-brief/2016/08/06/an-inconvenient-iota-of-truth

What might explain this?


Enter Professors Maskin and Kremer:

Nineteenth-century economist David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage predicts that China’s poorest workers should benefit most from the growth in trade. Before globalization, that country had a huge supply of unskilled workers and relatively few high-skill workers, who were thus in high demand; the situation was just the opposite in the United States. When two such countries begin to trade, the theory states, the less-developed nation has the advantage in producing relatively low-tech products—so demand and income for under-educated workers should shoot up, while their high-skill countrymen suffer. Thus, the theory predicts, globalization should lower inequality in the developing world.
Instead, as Gates professor of developing societies Michael Kremer explains, in much of the developing world, “The empirical evidence is not really consistent with the idea that trade is reducing inequality.” He and Adams University Professor Eric Maskin, a 2007 Nobel laureate in economics, have therefore proposed a new model to help explain the discrepancy between traditional theory and current reality. The key, they say, lies in a more nuanced understanding of how global production cycles sort workers into different jobs.

https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2015/03/how-globalization-begets-inequality

Here’s one way to understand their model. Note, before you proceed to read, that this is my explanation of their model, and I have simplified it a bit. I’ll add more nuance in as we go along:

Think of two countries, and two types of workers in both countries. Let’s say country 1 has Type A and Type B workers, and Country 2 has Type A1 and Type B2 workers. A and A1 are skilled workers, and B and B2 are unskilled workers. Maskin and Kremer make the point that international trade and the advent of modern globalization has resulted in skilled workers across countries “matching” with each other. As a result, their incomes go up, relative to unskilled workers in their own countries. So while the Stolper Samuelson theorem may be unable to explain why skilled workers have prospered even in developing countries, we now have a plausible answer to the question.

As an illustrative example, consider the fact that I joined a multinational firm called Genpact straight out of college.

And of course, one can think of many countries, not just two, and one can imagine a spectrum of skill sets across workers, rather than a binary framing. The point still holds!


And to complicate the matter further still, there may well be explicit/implicit choices made by policymakers in their own countries.

Back in the good old days, FT Alphaville used to be a free blog. And about seven years ago or so, it carried an excellent, excellent post written by Isabella Kaminska. The title of the (two-part) post was “What Are Chinese Capital Controls, Really?”. The post is a must-read for any student of international trade, but this excerpt is especially relevant for us today:

What those who accused China of using its exchange rate to gain advantage probably misunderstood was that it wasn’t the currency which was being undervalued, it was the people.


There are several other reasons why China should leave its currency unchanged. Contrary to widespread perception, China does not compete on the basis of an undervalued currency. It competes mainly in terms of labour costs, technology, quality control, infrastructure and an unwavering commitment to reform.

https://www.ft.com/content/d11a4c5e-d5fb-32f4-a606-e64d1483cea1 (Emphasis Added)

“It competes mainly in terms of labor costs” is a dry, academic way to put it. Elsewhere in this post, Isabella puts it much more plainly, when she says that it sucked to be a Chinese worker. And it did! Not just because of low labor costs, but because of a whole host of other reasons that should excite students of macroeconomics. Read the whole thing to get a richer understanding of how China has gone about doing what it has. As I always say to folks in my classes who wish we “grew like China”: be careful what you wish for!

You might also want to take a look at David Autor’s work on The China Shock. A good place to begin would be Russ Roberts’ podcast with David Autor, and for those who are interested, there’s a follow-up symposium about this episode as well. The point I’m making is that where trade between China and the USA is concerned, it would seem that inequality has gone up in both countries, but for different reasons.

This applies to international trade in general, of course – I’ve used China and US as examples because we are more familiar with them.

So, to return to the original question: are trade wars class wars? And more importantly, are class wars causing trade wars, or is it the other way around?

And so here we get to the book’s primary thesis. The authors only return to it in the conclusion, having reached it by a circuitous route that took them through history, data, theory, and more history.
The conclusion they ultimately draw is more nuanced than the one initially promised (and that’s a good thing, since nuance is good). In Klein and Pettis’ telling, global imbalances feed inequality in the U.S., but the fundamental cause isn’t inequality.

https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/book-review-trade-wars-are-class?s=r

Yup, that I completely agree with, and “get”. But it doesn’t solve the original problem of course, it only helps us understand that it exists: trade does seem to exacerbate inequality.

How we should think of this problem, how we might resolve it, and with what consequences, is likely to be fertile ground for economic research in the years to come. If you are a student wondering about how to go about picking a topic to work on, well, please do consider this one! And a good place to begin would be Noah’s post, (and the book itself sounds like a must read too).


Bonus material alert: I simply had to share this extract from Noah’s blog, written by Paul Krugman. If you have recently studied macro, you can thank me later for bringing this to your attention:

[E]conomic explanations…have to [describe] how the actions of individuals…add up to interesting behavior at the aggregate level.
And the key point is that individuals in general neither know nor care about aggregate accounting identities…. [I]f you want to claim that a rise in savings translates directly into a fall in the trade deficit, without any depreciation of the currency, you have to tell me how that rise in savings induces domestic consumers to buy fewer foreign goods, or foreign consumers to buy more domestic goods. Don’t tell me about how the identity must hold, tell me about the mechanism that induces the individual decisions that make it hold…. [O]nce you do that, you realize that something else has to be happening — a slump in the economy, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, it depends on the circumstances, but it can’t be immaculate, with nothing moving to enforce the identity….
Accounting identities… inform your stories about how people behave, [they do] not act as a substitute for behavioral analysis.

https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/mistaken-identities-wonkish/?pagewanted=all

Decoding the MPC Announcement

Mandar asks a question:

This can be a short story, and a long story. Let’s make it a long one!


Here’s the very last paragraph from the third chapter of the RBI’s Annual Report of the year 2015-16:

III.39 Going forward, the focus of the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy stance during 2015-16 will be on fostering a gradual and durable disinflationary process towards the target of below 6 per cent by January 2016 in order to achieve the centrally projected rate of 4 per cent by the end of 2017-18. At the same time, the efficacy of the monetary policy transmission mechanism needs to improve since the pass-through of recent cuts in policy rate to the bank lending rate has been partial, reflecting constraints in transmission under the existing base rate system. Identifying the impediments in pass-through and implementing an alternative method, such as marginal cost based credit pricing or identifying an appropriate benchmark for the bank lending rate will be a priority for the Reserve Bank. In this regard, it is imperative to develop market based benchmarks by developing the term segment of the money market. Thus, liquidity support may have to be progressively provided through regular auctions of longer term repos with reduced dependence on overnight fixed-rate liquidity support. While doing so, it will also be important to dampen deviations of WACR and other money market rates such as CBLO rates from the repo rate in a narrow range. The Reserve Bank will continue to explore and augment its instruments of liquidity management, including standing deposit facility for absorption of surplus liquidity, as recommended by the Expert Committee.

https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1149 (emphasis added)

(Students should also look up, by the way, what WACR and CBLO are). But back to our story: in 2016, the RBI was “continuing to explore and augment its instruments of liquidity management” – including a facility that we’ve all read a bit about this past week, the standing deposit facility.

First, what is liquidity management?

The “liquidity management” of a central bank is defined as the framework, set of instruments and
especially the rules the central bank follows in steering the amount of bank reserves in order to control
their price (i.e. short term interest rates) consistently with its ultimate goals (e.g. price stability).

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/1b.pdf

In English: the central bank would like to try and control short term interest rates in the economy, in order to keep prices as stable as possible. The framework that allows them to do so is referred to as liquidity management.

So how does liquidity management work in practice, whether in India or abroad? In most cases, via the “repo” rate and the “reverse repo” rate. The first of these is the rate at which banks can borrow from the central bank, and the second of these is the rate at which the central bank can borrow from the banks. Here’s a good, basic, explainer.

So ok, we have a framework, and we now know how it works. Then why, Mandar asks, do we now have the SDF?

Which, of course, begs the question: what is the SDF?

At the last meeting, banks were offered a facility to park surplus liquidity through an auctioning system, which was in addition to reverse repo facility. The idea is to suck the surplus liquidity out of the system through the variable reverse repo rate. Now, RBI has regularized the same under the SDF window, which offers 3.75% interest rate for funds parked without any collateral backing. The SDF window will help banks earn a minimum return when they have surplus funds. The SDF rate of 3.75% would be the floor policy rate.

https://www.livemint.com/economy/decoding-rbi-s-latest-monetary-policy-decisions-11649613385417.html

If banks in our country have excess funds (and right now, they most certainly do) what can the banks do with them? One option is to use the reverse repo mechanism and park these funds with the central bank. Or you could use the auctioning system, as the excerpt above explains. But now, in addition to both of these, you can also make use of the SDF.

The reverse repo in our country is right now at 3.35%, while the SDF will give you 3.75%. If you are a bank with excess funds, the RBI says you can give me these excess funds and I’ll pay you a) an interest rate of 3.35% if you use the reverse repo route OR b) I’ll pay you 3.75% if you use the SDF.

The naïve response to this is to go with option b). The not so naïve response is to ask “Wait, what’s the catch?”

Well, the catch is that reverse repo’s come with collateralization. When the central bank accepts excess funds from you, what it does in practice is it “sells” you securities, and “buys” them back at a slightly higher rate when it gives the funds back. “Buying them back” is a repurchase, and hence the terms repo (bank to central bank) and reverse repo (central bank to bank). When securities are involved, we say the deal is collateralized.

SDF? No collateralization.

Why? Well, there’s so much of excess liquidity floating about that the central bank was running out of securities to offer as collateral.

But ain’t this a rather risky thing, parking excess funds without collateralization? Well, this is the RBI we’re talking about. If you don’t trust the central bank, then what else is there boss? So no, we don’t need to worry about the lack of collateralization is the current stance, and all are ok with this.


So the effective rate is now 3.75, not 3.35?

Um no, it’s actually 4.00%. Remember those reverse repo auctions? Those have been averaging around 4%. So (and if you think this is confusing, join the club), if you’re a bank and have excess funds, the central bank now gives you three choices:

  1. Good ol’ reverse repo, with collateralization, but 3.35%
  2. SDF, 3.75%, but no collateralization
  3. Reverse repo auctions, 4.00%, with the same collateralization as is applicable for the LAF. (This last point is on a “best as I can tell” basis. If anybody reading this knows better, please help me and the readers out!)

So, (phew!), in effect the floor is 3.75% 4.00%.

And that’s the answer to Mandar’s question: this is why the RBI has introduced an SDF when we already have the reverse repo rate.


About This Measurement Business

(C) GDP figures are “man-made” and therefore unreliable, Li said. When evaluating Liaoning’s economy, he focuses on three figures: 1) electricity consumption, which was up 10 percent in Liaoning last year; 2) volume of rail cargo, which is fairly accurate because fees are charged for each unit of weight; and 3) amount of loans disbursed, which also tends to be accurate given the interest fees charged. By looking at
these three figures, Li said he can measure with relative accuracy the speed of economic growth. All other figures, especially GDP statistics, are “for reference only,” he said smiling.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BEIJING1760_a.html

This is an excerpt from the Wikileaks archive, and people familiar with modern economic history will know it all too well. This is, of course, the famous Li Keqiang index. If you prefer, you can read the original Economist article about it, although for once, the trademark Economist pun in the headline falls short of their typically high quality.

GDP measurements have always been tricky, and reading about GDP – it’s evolution, the data collection, the computation and the hajjar problems that arise from there – should be mandatory for any student aspiring to learn economics. Here’s a post from six years ago about some sources, if you’re interested.


But back to that excerpt above. What Li Keqiang was saying was that GDP statistics in China would often give a misleading picture, and he preferred to reach his own conclusions on the basis of other economic data. His preferred metrics were the ones mentioned in the abstract above: electricity consumption, volume of rail cargo and loans disbursed. Think of it this way: he’s really asking three questions. Is stuff being produced? Is stuff being moved around? Is stuff being purchased?

But what about covid times? Do these measures stand up, or do we need new proxies for GDP?

The variant’s speed also means that China’s economic prospects are unusually hard to track. A lot can happen in the time between a data point’s release and its reference period. The most recent hard numbers on China’s economy refer to the two months of January and February. Those (surprisingly good) figures already look dated, even quaint. For much of that period, there was no war in Europe. And new covid-19 cases in mainland China averaged fewer than 200 per day, compared with the 13,267 infections reported on April 4th. Relying on these official economic figures is like using a rear-view mirror to steer through a chicane.
For a more timely take on China’s fast-deteriorating economy, some analysts are turning to less conventional indicators. For example, Baidu, a popular search engine and mapping tool, provides a daily mobility index, based on tracking the movement of smartphones. Over the seven days to April 3rd, this index was more than 48% below its level a year ago.

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/omicron-is-dealing-a-big-blow-to-chinas-economy/21808576

But as the article goes on to say, this metric will tell you about movement across cities. But metro traffic gives you an idea of intra-city mobility, as do courier company express deliveries (and we did some very similar exercises in India during the lockdowns, of course. Here’s one example for Pune district.)


But the point isn’t just to come up with what else might be useful as GDP proxies. A follow-up question becomes equally important: do the GDP statistics make sense? As the Economist articles says, good numbers for metrics such as investment in fixed assets are hard to square with declines in steel output. The article contains many other such examples, and what you should take away as a student is your ability to develop a “smell” test for a given economy. Don’t take the reported numbers at face value, but “see” if they seem to be in line with other statistics about that economy.

I really like this article as an introduction to this topic because it also hints at how statisticians need to be especially careful about comparing data over time. Weekly declines might happen because of festivals, bad weather or a thousand other things, which may of course be going on along with pandemic induced lockdowns. Teasing out the effects of just one aspect isn’t an easy thing to do.

And finally, think about how you can apply this lesson in other domains! Should an interviewer look only at marks, or try and figure out other correlates. Or, as Mr. Keqiang puts it, are marks “for reference only”? What about quarterly earnings reports? Press releases? Smell tests matter, and the earlier you start developing them, the better you get at detecting, and calling bullshit.


And finally, the concluding paragraph from the article we’ve discussed today:


To help avoid some of the traps lurking in these unconventional indicators, Mr Lu and his team watch “a bunch of numbers, instead of just one”. In a recent report he highlighted 20 indicators, ranging from asphalt production to movie-ticket sales. “If seven or eight out of ten indicators are worsening, then we can be confident that GDP growth is getting worse,” he says. Right now, he thinks, the direction is clear. “Something must be going very wrong.”

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/omicron-is-dealing-a-big-blow-to-chinas-economy/21808576

Indeed.